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A. Introduction
Historically, international law' was an accepted part of
American jurisprudence.2 Early Supreme Court cases decreed that it
* J.D. Candidate, May 2008, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. I would like to thank
Noam Glick and Jennifer Gibson for their tremendous editorial support. I would also like to
thank Professor Georgene Vairo for her continuous encouragement. Finally, thank you to my
family and friends for their limitless patience and encouragement.
1. As used in this paper, "international law" refers to public and private international law
and the laws of foreign countries. For a discussion of the specific sources of international law
and the ways domestic courts use them, see infra Part C.
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was germane to the domestic legal system.' The Declaration of
Independence also identified that "a decent respect [should be paid]
to the opinions of mankind. '4 Yet, in spite of this early acceptance
of international law, there has been an uproar over recent Supreme
Court references to international law in cases such as Lawrence v.
Texas5 and Roper v. Simmons.6
If the early American legal system approved of international
law, how did referencing it become so unthinkable?7 One possible
explanation is that the current nationalist attitude reflects the United
States' evolution in the global community. Early attitudes towards
international law may have reflected a new nation's desire to be a
part of the global community.8 Acknowledging the importance of
international law likely aided its acceptance into that community.
Conversely, current attitudes may reflect a developed nation's
position as a global leader who creates the benchmark for protecting
many rights.9
2. See Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign
Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47
WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 755 (2005) (stating that the Court's citation to foreign law is not a
new practice); Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43,
44 (2004) ("[M]any of [Justice] Marshall's early opinions expressly promoted the implicit or
explicit internalization of international law into U.S. domestic law .....
3. See infra Part C.1.
4. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. I (U.S. 1776).
5. 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003).
6. 543 U.S. 551, 575-76 (2005); see infra Part D.1.
7. See H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005); see also Thomas P. Kilgannon, Does the
Constitution Matter?, GOPUSA, Mar. 10, 2005, http://www.gopusa.com/commentary/guest/2005/
tpk.0310p.shtml (stating that Congress should consider impeaching judges who rely on
international law to interpret the Constitution).
8. See, e.g., Rex D. Glensy, Which Countries Count? Lawrence v. Texas and the Selection
of Foreign Persuasive Authority, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 357, 365 (2005) ("[C]ompliance with the law
of nations was an expression of governmental legitimacy to the rest of [the] world."); Koh, supra
note 2, at 44 (indicating the "legitimacy of a fledgling nation" depended on being compatible with
international law).
9. See Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98
AM. J. INT'L L. 57, 67-68 (2004) (stating that other countries have severe restrictions on
reproductive rights and hate speech); see also J. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Lecture, Looking Beyond
Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 40 IDAHO
L. REv. 1, 1 (2003) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Lecture] (stating that the United States was one of the
first nations to develop the concept of judicial review); Joan L. Larsen, Importing Constitutional
Norms from a "Wider Civilization": Lawrence and the Rehnquist Court's Use of Foreign and
International Law in Domestic Constitutional Interpretation, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1283, 1320 (2004)
(stating that the United States is the leader in protecting abortion rights and freedom of speech).
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The current uproar may also reflect the controversial nature of
the issues implicated by the recent cases in which the Supreme Court
used international law. These issues include the death penalty and
sexual privacy rights, which have generally divided conservatives
and liberals."l The early cases that used international law to resolve
relatively non-controversial issues, such as admiralty, did not
generate the same criticism." Additionally, the conflict may
illustrate some scholars' view that the Court's recent use of
international law is distinguishable from its early use because the
early Court never applied international law in purely domestic
cases. 12
Amidst the clamor surrounding the Supreme Court's references
to international law, two camps have emerged: Nationalists and
Transnationalists. 1' Both sides agree that referencing international
law is appropriate when domestic law directs its application. 4 For
example, when an international treaty is adopted into U.S.
legislation, U.S. law directs domestic courts to apply the treaty when
a case implicates it. Under those circumstances, both sides agree that
10. See Osmar J. Benvenuto, Reevaluating the Debate Surrounding the Supreme Court's
Use of Foreign Precedent, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2695, 2708 (2006) (stating that recent cases
"presented the perennially problematic and contentious issues of homosexual sodomy and the
death penalty"); J. Harvie Wilkinson, The Use of International Law in Judicial Decisions, 27
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 423, 425 (2004) ("Where courts go too far.., is where they rely upon
international ... precedents when resolving important and contentious social issues."); see also
Roper, 543 U.S. at 559 (involving the juvenile death penalty); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562
(addressing an individual's right to sexual privacy); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 310 (2002)
(evaluating the death penalty for the mentally disabled).
11. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (resolving whether the United States
could condemn fishing vessels); Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 CRANCH) 64,
64-65 (1804) (deciding whether a shipping vessel was wrongfully captured under a congressional
act prohibiting commerce between the United States and France).
12. See Wilkinson, supra note 10, at 423 ("[T]he nature of the reliance [on international law]
is changing. The Court has recently turned to foreign courts to support key positions in major
rulings on wholly domestic social issues."). But see Koh, supra note 2, at 44 ("The original
design and early practice of our courts envisioned that they would not merely accept, but would
actively pursue, an understanding and incorporation of international law standards out of a decent
respect for the opinions of mankind.").
13. See infra Part D.
14. See Benvenuto, supra note 10, at 2701-02; J. Antonin Scalia, Keynote Address at the
Ninety-Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law: Foreign Legal
Authority in the Federal Courts, 98 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 305, 305 (2004); see also J.
Antonin Scalia & J. Stephen Breyer, A Conversation Between U.S. Supreme Court Justices: The
Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases, 3 INT'L J. CONST. L. 519,
521 (2005) [hereinafter Scalia-Breyer Debate] (Justice Scalia stating that using foreign law is
appropriate "in the interpretation of a treaty").
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a domestic court may also refer to international courts'
interpretations of the treaty in reaching its decision. 5 The major
disagreement between the two camps occurs when no domestic law
points to international law, but a domestic court still discusses it in
resolving a case.16 For example, in Roper, the Court discussed an
international treaty even though the United States was not a signatory
and no domestic law pointed to its use. 7 Transnationalists argued
that discussing the treaty was appropriate, because the Court
indicated that the treaty was not binding on its decision. 8
Nationalists argued that it was inappropriate to mention the treaty,
because the case did not implicate international law. 9
This Article discusses the Nationalist and Transnationalist views
toward domestic courts' references to international law, and it
compares these recent references to the Supreme Court's early use of
international law. Part B of the Article further defines the current
debate by highlighting the differences between cases in which both
sides agree that the application of international law is appropriate,
versus cases in which the two sides diverge. Part C compares the
circumstances surrounding the Supreme Court's recent references to
international law to the circumstances surrounding its early
international law references in order to identify any similarities or
differences between the two. Part D summarizes the arguments of
Nationalists and Transnationalists. Finally, Part E concludes that it is
uncertain whether the Supreme Court will continue to reference
international law, particularly since two new Justices have joined the
Court.
15. Scalia, supra note 14, at 305.
16. See infra Part D.
17. Roperv. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576 (2005).
18. J. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, An Open Discussion, 36 CONN. L. REv. 1033, 1042 (2004)
[hereinafter Ginsburg, Discussion] (stating that international law "doesn't bind us"); Scalia-
Breyer Debate, supra note 14, at 522-23.
19. See Benvenuto, supra note 10, at 2701-02, 2720; Glensy, supra note 8, at 380-81
(noting that Justice Scalia stated that American law does not have to conform to international law
and there is "no common reference" between international and domestic law); Ernesto J. Sanchez,
A Case Against Judicial Internationalism, 38 CONN. L. REv. 185, 188-89 (2005) ("Foreign
materials . . . as well as international conventions can indeed assist judges in interpreting the
Constitution as it applies to matters involving such conventions, international law in general, or
some sort of foreign interest.").
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B. Prescribed vs. Independent International Law References
There are several instances in which both Nationalists and
Transnationalists agree that it is proper for domestic courts to use
international law to resolve a case: when the case implicates an
international treaty or convention to which the United States is a
signatory; when the case implicates customary international law; and
when the case implicates international law under the forum's choice
of law method." Moreover, both camps agree that it is appropriate
for courts to use foreign case jurisprudence and legislative
enactments as persuasive authority to interpret implicated
international law.2' However, the crux of the disagreement between
Nationalists and Transnationalists is whether a domestic court should
use international law, even as persuasive authority, when none of
these established uses of international law apply.22
International treaties and conventions 3 to which the United
States is a signatory are binding international law.24 If a treaty is
20. See Scalia, supra note 14, at 305.
21. See id. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") section 44.1 is the procedural
mechanism by which parties may plead international law, in the "agreed upon" categories of
international law. F. R. Civ. P. 44.1. Case law indicates that it is most often applicable in the
choice of law category. See generally Swiss Credit Bank v. Balink, 614 F.2d 1269, 1271-72
(10th Cir. 1980) (determining that Swiss law applied based on the parties' stipulation that it
governed their relationship and, under FRCP 44.1, it was adequately pleaded); Siegelman v.
Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 192-93 (2d Cir. 1955) (resolving whether English law
governed the case since the ticket purchased by plaintiffs stated English law would govern the
contract). Once a party gives notice of its intent to plead international law, FRCP 44.1 allows a
court to investigate the content of international law using any relevant material, regardless of its
admissibility in court. See generally, Swiss, 614 F.2d at 1272 (holding that FRCP 44.1 "gives the
court wide latitude in determining foreign law, and it can consider any relevant material.");
Ramirez v. Autobuses Blancos Flecha Roja, 486 F.2d 493, 497 n.l (5th Cir. 1973) ("[FRCP
44.1 ] clearly and properly permits the District Court to 'consider any relevant material or sources'
'in determining foreign law."').
22. Benvenuto, supra note 10, at 2757 (stating that Nationalists argue international law
should play "no substantive role" in Constitutional interpretation and Transnationalists argue that
the United States can learn from international law); Sanchez, supra note 19, at 188 ("[T]he
decisions that have generated most of the debate concerning the proper role of foreign and
international law in American jurisprudence have primarily involved purely domestic matters that
mandate no reference to anything other than American law."); Scalia, supra note 14, at 307-08
("It is my view that modem foreign legal materials can never be relevant to an interpretation of-
to the meaning of-the U.S. Constitution.").
23. The remainder of this Article uses "treaties" to refer to both treaties and conventions.
Treaties and conventions are international agreements between two or more nations. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 355 (8th ed. 2004).
24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 111, cmts. b, c, h, 321 (1987);
see also U.S. CONST. art. VI (stating that "treaties made ... under the authority of the United
States," are, like the Constitution itself and the laws of the United States, the "supreme law of the
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self-executing or if Congress has implemented legislation to give it
effect, courts must apply the treaty's rules unless the United States
opted out of the rule before executing the treaty or the rule is
contrary to the Constitution. 25  Thus, an international treaty to which
the United States is a signatory essentially becomes U.S. law.26
Further, most scholars agree that it is appropriate for domestic
courts to reference other signatory countries' interpretations of a
treaty as persuasive authority, at least when no domestic law
interprets it.27  A treaty constitutes a standard, binding law that all
signatory countries have agreed to follow. 28  The United States, as a
signatory to the treaty, agrees to observe the same law.29  Thus, it is
appropriate to reference international and foreign courts'
interpretations of the treaty as "persuasive evidence of what the law
s"930is.
' 3
Another binding source of international law is customary
international law.3' Customary international law is international
land" under Article VI of the Constitution, and "judges . . . shall be bound" by them).
International conventions to which the United States is a signatory are also considered binding
law for U.S. courts because they have the same authority as treaties to which the United States is
a signatory. See Chateau des Charmes Wines Ltd. v. Sabate USA Inc., 328 F.3d 528, 530 (9th
Cir. 2003) ("Because the President submitted the Convention to the Senate, which ratified it,
there is no doubt that the Convention is valid and binding federal law." (citation omitted)).
25. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, § 111(2)-(4), cmts. (a)-(c), (h).
26. DAVID J. BEDERMAN WITH CHRISTOPHER J. BORGEN & DAVID A. MARTIN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES 5 (American Society of International Law &
Foundation Press 2003); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, §
I1I1(I), cmt. b.
27. See Sanchez, supra note 19, at 192, 194 (stating that, if the United States is a signatory to
a treaty, it is appropriate for U.S. courts to contemplate a foreign court's interpretation of that
treaty if there are no American sources that offer guidance); Scalia, supra note 14, at 305 (stating
that, in the interpretation of a treaty to which the United States is a signatory, it is appropriate to
reference international courts' interpretations of that treaty, at least as persuasive authority); Tim
Wu, Foreign Exchange Should the Supreme Court Care What Other Countries Think?, SLATE,
Apr. 9, 2004, http://www.slate.corn/toolbar.aspx?action=print&id=2098559 ("The use of foreign
law to help ascertain a treaty's meaning is uncontroversial.").
28. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, §§ 11, cmts. c, h, 321.
29. Id. §§ Ill, cmts. c, h, 321, cmt. b.
30. Id. §§ 103 cmt. b, 111, cmts. c, h, 321; see also Zicherman v. Korean Airlines Co., 516
U.S. 217, 221-23 (1996) (referencing other nations' interpretations of the Warsaw Convention,
and stating that "[m]any signatory nations, including Czechoslovakia, Denmark, [and]
Germany... did not.., recognize a cause of action for nonpecuniary harm resulting from
wrongful death").
31. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, § 102(l)(a), (c); see also Andrew
T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 115, 122 (2005) ("Some
of the norms that have emerged among states are known as legal rules-rules of customary
law.").
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common law that has developed "from [the] general and consistent
practice" of the countries that choose to abide by it.3 2  These
countries "follow [it] from a sense of legal obligation."33 There is no
precise test to determine when a practice has become sufficiently
general and consistent to constitute customary international law, "but
[the practice in question] should reflect wide acceptance among
[countries] particularly involved in the relevant activity. ' 34  "[A]
practice that is generally followed but which [countries] feel legally
free to disregard" is not customary international law.35
Because of the uncertainty in determining when a country's
common practices have developed into customary international law,
it is difficult to determine when a common practice is binding on a
country. 36 However, if a common U.S. practice has developed into
customary international law, it essentially becomes part of domestic
law, and, if implicated, U.S. courts are bound to apply it.37 Since the
United States has agreed to adhere to law that binds other nations in
similar circumstances, it is appropriate for domestic courts to
reference other courts' interpretations of that law as persuasive
authority.3 8
32. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, § 102, cmt. b-d; see also United
States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 91 n.24 (2d Cir. 2003) ("Customary international law is comprised
of those practices and customs that States view as obligatory and that are engaged in or otherwise
acceded to by a preponderance of States in a uniform and consistent fashion."); A. Mark
Weisburd, American Judges and International Law, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1475, 1478
(2003) ("[I]n the CIL system, there is no sovereign with authority to control independent
states .... ).
33. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, § 102, cmts. b-d; see also
Yousef 327 F.3d at 91 n.24; Weisburd, supra note 32, at 1478.
34. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, § 102 cmt. b; see also Yousef
327 F.3d at 93 (citing United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 WHEAT.) 153, 160-61 (1820)) ("[A]
court should identify the norms of customary international law by looking to 'the general usage
and practice of nations [,] or by [looking to] judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that
law.. .[, or by] consulting the works of jurists writing professedly on public law."'); Weisburd,
supra note 32, at 1480 (stating that what counts as a state practice is not defined).
35. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, § 102 cmt. c.
36. Nadine Strossen, Recent U.S. and International Judicial Protection of Individual Rights:
A Comparative Legal Process Analysis and Proposed Synthesis, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 816
(1990); see also Kathleen M. Kedian, Customary International Law and International Human
Rights Litigation in United States Courts: Revitalizing the Legacy of the Paquete Habana, 40
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1395, 1396-97 (1999) ("Determining the scope of customary international
law is often difficult."); Larsen, supra note 9, at 1305-07 (recognizing the difficulty of trying to
determine what is customary international law).
37. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, § 102(l)(a),(c), cmt. j.
38. Id. §§ 102 cmt. j, 103 cmt. b; see also Sanchez, supra note 19, at 188 (stating that
foreign materials can assist judges if a case raises some international interest).
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U.S. courts are also bound to apply international law to resolve
domestic disputes when the forum's choice of law rules point to
international law.39 For example, assume there is a contract dispute
between two parties, each of whom resides in a different country.
The court that hears the case will have to determine which
jurisdiction's laws to apply. If the court determines that a foreign
country's law should apply, then it is bound to apply that country's
law to the dispute. The court will also have to interpret the foreign
country's law. In those circumstances, it is appropriate for the court
to look to the foreign country's case law and legislation, as
persuasive authority, to determine how to correctly apply the law.
Nationalists and Transnationalists agree that, in the situations
described above, it is appropriate for domestic courts to apply
international law and to reference other countries' interpretations of
that law.4" However, the recent debate over the Supreme Court's use
of international law centers on the Court's application of
international law in cases that do not fall into any of the prescribed
uses discussed above.41  For example, the Court in Atkins v.
Virginia42 had to decide whether it was unconstitutional to execute
the mentally disabled.43 Although no treaty, customary law, or
foreign country's law applied, the Court referenced international law
in its decision, surveying other countries' laws to see how many of
them imposed the death penalty for the mentally disabled."
The debate between the Nationalists and Transnationalists
focuses on the propriety of cases, like Atkins, in which domestic
39. James P. George, False Conflicts and Faulty Analyses: Judicial Misuse of Governmental
Interests in the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 23 REv. LITIG. 489, 495-97, 501, 511,
519 (2004) (stating that there are essentially three main choice of law methodologies that
currently exist in the United States, with variations in each state, including the vested-rights
doctrine (adopted by states such as Connecticut), the most significant relationship test (adopted
by states such as New York), and the governmental interest analysis (adopted by states such as
California)).
40. See Benvenuto, supra note 10, at 2701-02; Scalia, supra note 14, at 305; see also Scalia-
Breyer Debate, supra note 14, at 521 (Justice Scalia stating that using foreign law to interpret a
treaty is appropriate); supra Part B.
41. Benvenuto, supra note 10, at 2757; Sanchez, supra note 19, at 188.
42. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
43. Id. at310.
44. Id. at 316 n.21; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-73 (2003) (surveying
other nations' laws such as the British Parliament's "1957 repeal of laws punishing homosexual
conduct"); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958) (concluding that denationalization for
desertion was cruel and unusual punishment).
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courts "reference" international law "independently"-meaning that
they use international law as persuasive authority in instances other
than those falling in the aforementioned categories. 45 The debate has
particularly focused on cases in which the Court does this while
interpreting the Constitution.46  Transnationalists argue that
independently referencing international law is appropriate because
courts are only using the international law for informational
purposes-that is, as persuasive authority-not as binding law.47
Nationalists, however, argue against independently referencing
international law, even when only as persuasive authority.48
C. Examples of Domestic Courts' References to International Law
Nationalists and Transnationalists disagree on whether precedent
supports the Court's recent independent references to international
law. 49  Nationalists argue that the Supreme Court's early references
to international law all occurred in certain, limited circumstances,
none of which were implicated in any of the recent cases in which
the Court referenced international law.5  Conversely,
Transnationalists argue that the Court's recent references are
authorized by the early cases.5
45. Sanchez, supra note 19, at 188-89.
46. Id. at 200-01.
47. See, e.g., Benvenuto, supra note 10, at 2697 (arguing "use of foreign precedent is largely
inconsequential" and "used rhetorically, not substantially"); Glensy, supra note 8, at 366-67
(stating that "comparative analysis" is using law in "an advisory role"); Sanchez, supra note 19,
at 185 (discussing recent use of foreign authority as persuasive and instructive in cases such as
Lawrence, Atkins, and Roper); see also infra Part D.2.
48. Sanchez, supra note 19, at 201 ("Th[e] apparent deference to foreign legal authorities or
inapplicable treaties in the wake of making decisions that do not require their use constitutes the
crux of many observers' concerns .... "); see also H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005) (resolving
that courts should not base judgments on international law and opinion).
49. Sanchez, supra note 19, at 196-97.
50. See Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 2, at 894-95 ("We are inclined to believe that it is
legitimate in a few contexts for the Court to look to foreign law, but that does not mean that the
Court ought to cite foreign law in substantive due process cases."); Sanchez, supra note 19, at 200
(arguing that the early Court never referenced international law on its own; the circumstances in
the early cases implicated international law).
51. Stephen Arvin, Roper v. Simmons and International Law, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 209, 218
(2005) ("In fortifying Roper v. Simmons' evolving standards of decency analysis with the
principles of the international community, the majority was following a long established tradition
of Supreme Court jurisprudence."); Koh, supra note 2, at 44.
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1. Early Supreme Court Citations to International Law
Transnationalists observe that the Supreme Court's history has
been rife with international law references. 2 These early references,
they argue, indicate the importance of international law in U.S.
jurisprudence.53
Many Transnationalists identify The Paquete Habana4 as the
"seminal case" on the status of international law in the American
legal system.5 In Paquete, Spanish owners of two shipping vessels
filed wrongful condemnation claims after an American ship captured
their vessels. 6 No domestic law dictated whether the United States
could capture and condemn foreign fishing vessels as prizes of war. 7
To determine whether the United States could do so, the Court
reviewed the practices of other nations such as France and England. 8
Those countries historically disfavored the practice of capturing
fishing vessels that were merely engaging in their livelihood. 9 The
court adopted the international custom, stating, "[i]nternational law is
part of our law," and where there is no domestic law relevant to
resolving a particular claim, "resort must be had to the customs and
52. See Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 2, at 755 (concluding that it is incorrect to say the
Court has never cited to international law).
53. E.g., Andrew R. Dennington, We Are the World? Justifying the U.S. Supreme Court's
Use of Contemporary Foreign Legal Practice in Atkins, Lawrence, and Roper, 29 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 269, 272-75 (2006) ("While conservative critics of the Court's recent use of
contemporary foreign legal materials in domestic constitutional interpretation describe this as an
'alarming new trend,' this is, in fact, not a novel phenomenon."); Glensy, supra note 8, at 359
("[C]omparative analysis is hardly a 'new' phenomenon"). See generally Hilton v. Guyot, 159
U.S. 113, 163-66 (1895) (looking at laws in effect in Holland, Germany, Russia, Switzerland in
holding that the judgment previously obtained in France was not entitled to full faith and credit in
the United States); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 HOWARD) 393, 477-80, 485-86, 496
(1857) (referencing English, French and Roman slavery laws); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S.)(14
PET.) 540, 540-45 (1840) (analogizing the case's circumstances, where Canada requested
extradition of its citizen, who was a suspected murderer, to English cases but acknowledged that
the outcome will ultimately be determined by reviewing the Constitution); Chisholm v. Georgia,
2 U.S. (12 DALL.) 419, 437-45 (1793) (reviewing English cases to conclude that an action for
assumpsit cannot be legally maintained against a state).
54. 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
55. Sanchez, supra note 19, at 196 (stating that Paquete is the seminal case summarizing the
early Court's approach to international law); see also Ginsburg Discussion, supra note 18, at 1040
("The great Chief Justice John Marshall affirmed that international law is part of the law of the
United States.").
56. Paquete, 175 U.S. at 678-79, 686.
57. Id. at 686, 700.
58. Id. at 686-700.
59. Id.
1416
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usages of [c]ivilized nations. 6 Accordingly, the Court concluded
that the American ship wrongfully captured the Spanish vessels.6
Thus, the Court indicated that international law is relevant in
resolving a dispute, at least where there is no domestic law on the
issue.62
Similar to Paquete, Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle63 is
another early case that, Transnationalists argue, endorses
independent references to international law, at least in the absence of
domestic law.64 In Thirty Hogsheads, an "American privateer"
captured and condemned a British ship as "enemy property" during
war with England.65 A Danish subject sought to recover sugar,
which he believed to be his, that was on board the ship.66 He claimed
that it was wrongfully condemned, because it was Danish property,
not British property.67 Because no domestic rule dictated the
ownership of the property, Justice Marshall referenced a British rule,
which said that produce is owned by the country that owns the soil
that yielded the produce.68 Justice Marshall acknowledged that the
British rule was not binding on U.S. decisions, but stated that "[t]he
law of nations is the great source from which we derive those
rules ... which are... common to every country," and "[t]he
decisions of the Courts of every country ... will be considered in
adopting [a] rule."69 Thus, the Court held that the ship and its cargo
belonged to Britain and were rightfully condemned as enemy
property.7" By using British law to resolve this case, Justice Marshall
indicated that, at least in some circumstances, it is appropriate for the
60. Id. at 700, 708. But cf Sanchez, supra note 19, at 196-97 (stating that Paquete does not
stand for the proposition that the Court has always approved of using international law because of
the qualifying language that international law can only be applied in the absence of domestic
legislation).
61. Paquete, 175 U.S. at 714.
62. Id. at 700.
63. 13 U.S. (9 CRANCH) 191 (1815).
64. See Glensy, supra note 8, at 365.
65. Thirty Hogshead, 13 U.S. (9 CRANCH) at 195.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 195-96.
68. Id. at 196-97.
69. Id. at 198.
70. Id. at 199.
1417
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1407
Court to use international law to resolve a case if domestic law does
not resolve it.7
In addition to arguing that early cases endorse the use of
international law when domestic law does not apply,
Transnationalists argue that, under Murray v. Schooner Charming
Betsy,72 domestic courts should interpret domestic law consistently
with international law whenever possible. Schooner involved the
capture and condemnation of a former American vessel-the
Charming Betsy-under an act that authorized the capture of
American ships engaging in commercial dealings with France or any
of its territories.74 The Charming Betsy was owned by a former U.S.
citizen and was captured while it was transporting goods to a French
territory. 5 The Court had to determine whether the Charming Betsy
and its owner fell within the intent of the act under which the
Charming Betsy was captured.76 In interpreting Congress' intent, the
Court stated that "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains. ' '  Consequently, the Court held that Congress did not
intend to include former citizens engaged in purely commercial
dealings within the act; otherwise, the act would be punishing
commerce abroad more than is allowed by the "law of nations. 7' By
interpreting a federal statute in light of international law, the Court
indicated that U.S. courts should look to international law to ensure
71. But see Sanchez, supra note 19, at 199 (arguing international issues were applicable to
this claim so it was appropriate for the Court to reference international law but the Court has
never endorsed referencing international law when it was not applicable and especially when it
was not consistent with American law).
72. 6 U.S. (2 CRANCH) 64 (1804).
73. See, e.g., Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 2, at 765 (arguing Schooner "constitutes a
clear acceptance by the Marshall court of the background importance of foreign sources of law.");
Glensy, supra note 8, at 365 (stating that, based on Schooner and other cases, it was "apparent
that sources of law whose genesis was foreign to the United States could, and did, impact federal
statutory construction.").
74. Schooner, 6 U.S. (2 CRANCH) at 64-66 (1804).
75. Id. at 64, 66.
76. Id. at 118.
77. Id. at 118-20.
78. Id. at 118.
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some level of harmony between U.S. law and the laws of other
countries.79
2. The Supreme Court's More
Recent References to International Law
The Supreme Court has independently referenced international
law in several recent cases involving human rights and civil
liberties.8" In most of these cases, the Court has referenced
international law in interpreting the Eighth Amendment to protect
individuals from cruel and unusual state action. The Court has also
referenced international law in Fourteenth Amendment cases to
protect liberty rights, although it has referenced international law in
these cases less frequently than it has in Eighth Amendment cases.
a. The Eighth Amendment
The Court has referenced international law in Eighth
Amendment cases to determine whether a punishment is cruel and
unusual. In Trop v. Dulles,"1 the Court used international law to
develop a community standard for determining whether a particular
form of punishment violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment.82 The Court held that the
constitutionality of state action must be measured against "the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society."83 The petitioner in Trop was a U.S. citizen who lost his
citizenship under the National Act of 1840 when he was convicted of
79. Id. at 118-20; see also Glensy, supra note 8, at 365 ("[I]f two interpretations of an act of
Congress were plausible, that interpretation which complied with the law of nations would be
preferred over that which did not.").
80. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 316 n.21 (2002); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958); see also Calabresi & Zimdahl,
supra note 2, at 885, 891, 903-05; Mark Wendell DeLaquil, Foreign Law and Opinion in State
Courts, 69 ALB. L. REV. 697, 701-02 (2006) (stating that international law is most often
addressed in the context of the Eighth Amendment); Glensy, supra note 8, at 367 (contending the
Supreme Court usually references international law when fundamental human rights, usually
involving the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment or Due
Process rights, are at stake).
81. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
82. Id. at 100-03.
83. Id. at 100-01; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561 (2005); Atkins, 536 U.S. at
311-12; Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977) (resolving that, since the plurality in
Trop emphasized international law, it is "not irrelevant here that out of 60 major nations ... only
3 retained the death penalty for rape").
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wartime desertion.84 He argued that stripping him of his citizenship
constituted cruel and unusual punishment.85 The Court looked at the
English Declaration of Rights and the Magna Carta, which formed
the basis of the Eighth Amendment, to determine the policy
underlying the Eighth Amendment.86  It determined that the
amendment limited the government to "civilized standards" in the
types of punishment it could levy against individuals.87 It further
stated that "[t]he civilized nations of the world are in virtual
unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for
crime."88 As a result, it held that denationalization constituted cruel
and unusual punishment.89 By referencing international standards in
determining whether denationalization was cruel and unusual, the
Trop Court indicated that international law is a component of the
Eighth Amendment community standard.
The Court reaffirmed its willingness to reference international
law within the Eighth Amendment context with its decision in the
2002 case, Atkins. The Court in Atkins had to resolve whether the
death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment as applied to mentally
disabled persons.9" The Court first applied the Trop standard,
looking at the national attitude toward mentally disabled offenders to
determine whether the death penalty for mentally disabled persons
was unconstitutional.9 It then looked at other countries' practices to
get a "broader social and professional consensus" and found that
most countries had rejected this type of state action.92 Although the
Court acknowledged that international law was not dispositive, it
referenced it to "lend[] further support to [the] conclusion that there
[wa]s a consensus" against this type of state action. 93 Thus, by using
84. Trop, 356 U.S. at 87-88.
85. Id. at 88.
86. Id. at 99-100.
87. Id. at 100 ("Fines, imprisonment and even execution may be imposed depending upon
the enormity of the crime, but any technique outside the bounds of these traditional penalties is
constitutionally suspect.").
88. Id. at 102.
89. Id. at 103.
90. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
91. Id. at 310-12,315-16.
92. Id. at311-12,316n.21.
93. Id. at 316 n.21.
1420
Summer 2007] REFERENCING INTERNATIONAL LAW
international views to support its conclusion, the Atkins court upheld
Trop's international community standard.94
Roper, decided in 2005, is the Supreme Court's most recent
Eighth Amendment death penalty case, and is at the center of the
recent controversy over the use of international law.95 In Roper, the
Court had to determine whether the juvenile death penalty fell
outside the standards of decency of civilized nations.96  The
defendant in Roper was convicted of murder when he was seventeen
years old and sentenced to the death penalty.97 After the Atkins court
overturned the death penalty for the mentally disabled, he filed a new
appeal arguing that the Atkins Court's reasoning also applied to the
juvenile death penalty.98 In determining whether the juvenile death
penalty was cruel and unusual punishment, the Court followed an
approach that was similar to its analysis in Atkins.99 First, it surveyed
state legislation to determine the national view on the subject and
concluded that there was a national consensus against the juvenile
death penalty."' It then referenced international law in the same way
it did in Atkins, acknowledging that it was not binding, but using it to
"find[] confirmation" for its conclusion that the juvenile death
penalty fell outside society's standards of decency.' It surveyed
other nations' views on the juvenile death penalty, and noted that the
United States was one of the few countries that had not ratified
Article 37 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child.0 2  This supported its prior conclusion that the Eighth
Amendment prohibited the juvenile death penalty.0 3 In Roper, the
Court again showed that it may reference international law in the
94. Trop, 356 U.S. at 103.
95. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555 (2005); see infra Part D.
96. Roper, 543 U.S. at 559, 561.
97. Id. at 557-58.
98. Id. at 559.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 90-94.
100. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-65, 567.
101. Id. at 575, 578. Disagreeing with the majority that a "genuine national consensus"
existed, Justice O'Connor supported using international law to determine Eighth Amendment
violations because the Court has consistently referred to international law in Eighth Amendment
issues. See id. at 604-05 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 576 ("Article 37 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child...
contains an express prohibition on capital punishment for crimes committed by juveniles under
18.").
103. Id. at 568, 575.
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interpretation of the Eighth Amendment with respect to human rights
issues. However, it never addressed what it would do if international
law conflicted with domestic law.
b. The Fourteenth Amendment
There are fewer independent references to international law in
Fourteenth Amendment cases. One case in which the Court used
international law to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment is Lawrence
v. Texas."° Lawrence sparked an intense controversy surrounding
the propriety of independently referencing international law,
particularly in the context of sexual privacy rights." 5 In Lawrence,
the petitioners, who were convicted under a Texas statute making it a
crime for same-sex persons to engage in sexual conduct, claimed the
statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment.0 6 A prior case, Bowers
v. Hardwick,"°7 had held that there was no right to engage in certain
homosexual conduct." 8 However, the Court in Lawrence reversed
Bowers, holding that there was no long-standing national history
prohibiting homosexual conduct as the Bowers Court claimed.0 9
After finding domestic support for the recognition of a right to sexual
privacy, the Court reviewed international history and found a right to
sexual privacy in the "history of Western civilization and ... Judeo-
Christian moral and ethical standards[.]"" It also cited Dudgeon v.
United Kingdom,"' a European Court of Human Rights case that
held that laws proscribing same-sex intimate conduct violated the
104. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
105. Id. at 572-73; see also David Fontana, The Next Generation of Transnational/Domestic
Constitutional Law Scholarship: A Reply to Professor Tushnet, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 445, 451
(2004) ("Lawrence involved constitutional questions surrounding a politically controversial issue,
homosexuality, so it was sure to again attention .... ); Wu, supra note 27 ("House Republicans
reacted angrily to last spring's Lawrence v. Texas .....
106. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562-63.
107. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
108. Id. at 190-91.
109. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568, 578. The Court's re-interpretation of international
consensus, however, has fueled one of the most controversial arguments against independently
referencing international law, namely that judges are able to search through various international
laws to find those that comport with their personal preferences to support their decisions. E.g., id.
at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority haphazardly applied international law
because it failed to look at all of the relevant international law); see also infra Part D.
110. Id. at 572.
111. 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 52(1981).
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European Convention,' 12 and it used that case as support for its
decision that the Fourteenth Amendment affords similar protection
for those rights in the United States." 3 Although the Court has not
independently referenced international law in Due Process cases as
often as it has in Eighth Amendment cases, the Lawrence Court does
extend the international analysis in its Eighth Amendment cases to
the privacy rights realm. Lawrence indicates the Court's willingness
to reference international law to protect Due Process rights.
Justice Ginsburg referenced international law in a similar way in
her concurrence in Grutter v. Bollinger."4 In that case, the Court
considered whether the use of race as a factor in admissions policies
violated the Equal Protection Clause."5 The Court held that such a
policy could survive strict scrutiny if the admissions policy were
narrowly tailored to meet the compelling government interest of
diversity." 6 One way the policy could do so was to be "limited in
time."" 7  In her concurrence, Justice Ginsburg cited international
affirmative action programs to support the majority's conclusion that
"race conscious programs" should be limited in time.' 8 She also
referenced the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, which stated that affirmative action
programs should only remain in place until their objectives have
been met." 9 Justice Ginsburg's use of international law to support
the majority's conclusion is consistent with the Lawrence Court's
use of international law to support its recognition of a right to sexual
privacy.
3. Comparing Early and Recent International Law References
Nationalists argue that the circumstances surrounding the
Supreme Court's early references are distinguishable from its recent
references, and thus, do not provide precedent for these recent
cases. '2 Transnationalists, however, argue that the Court's recent
112. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573.
113. Id. at 576-78.
114. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
115. Id. at311,316-17.
116. Id. at 326, 328.
117. Id. at 342.
118. Id. at 344 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
119. Id.
120. See Sanchez, supra note 19, at 192; see also Benvenuto, supra note 10, at 2701-04.
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references are consistent with the role international law played in
those early cases.
12 1
The early cases discussed above, although still good law, can be
distinguished from the Court's recent references. In each of the early
cases, the controversy involved at least one foreign party and
occurred outside of national borders. 122  The early Court never
applied international law to resolve a purely domestic issue involving
only domestic parties. The Court's recent cases, however, have
involved only domestic parties.'23 Additionally, each of the recent
cases questioned the constitutionality of U.S. government action
within the United States. 24  Thus, it could be argued that there were
some international implications in each of these early cases, leading
the Court to reference international law. Those international
implications are absent in the Court's recent references.'
25
Another distinction between the early and recent cases is that the
recent cases raised constitutional questions.2 6 The early Court never
referenced international law to interpret the Constitution; it
referenced international law to resolve admiralty questions and issues
surrounding appropriate war-time actions. 27 It could be argued that
these early cases supported referencing international law only when
cases raised global issues, or issues that were common to all
countries. 28  The early cases may have also implicated customary
international law, because they raised these common issues. If so,
121. Arvin, supra note 51, at 218 (stating that the majority's reference to international law in
Roper "follow[ed] a long established tradition of Supreme Court jurisprudence."); Koh, supra
note 2, at 44.
122. Sanchez, supra note 19, at 192 (stating that recent cases only involved American
statutes, American parties, and events occurring within the United States).
123. See supra Part C.2.
124. See id.
125. E.g., Benvenuto, supra note 10, at 2701-04 (stating that there are only a few examples
where the court used foreign precedent for a non-international purpose in early cases).
126. See supra Parts C.2; see also Sanchez, supra note 19, at 211 ("Roper carried no
implications beyond United States borders except in the realm of public opinion. It was a case
concerning the murder of an American national ... on American soil which was investigated by
American authorities.").
127. See supra Part C.1.
128. Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 2, at 764. ("Neither admiralty law nor the law of
nations [is a traditional] area of constitutional law.., such as Eighth Amendment and substantive
due process cases. A big difference is that in both admiralty and law of nations cases it could be
argued that the Constitution invites the Court to . . . consider[] foreign law."); Sanchez, supra
note 19, at 194 (stating that "international law is relevant [to such issues] as maritime law").
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the Court could reference international law to interpret the customary
international law. 129 However, the U.S. Constitution is not common
to all nations; it is particular to the United States. The Constitution
does not implicate customary international law. 3° Thus, the Court's
early international law references may not authorize its more recent
references in the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment cases discussed
above.' 3'
Additionally, the role of domestic law in the early cases is
distinguishable from its role in recent cases. Before the Court in
Paquete referenced international law, it stated that no domestic law
resolved the case.3 2 Similarly, in Thirty Hogshead, the Court looked
at the British rule only after it determined that no domestic rule
resolved the case.'33 Even in Schooner, which implicated a domestic
statute, the Court only looked to international law after it concluded
that the congressional intent behind the implicated act was unclear.'34
Thus, the early Court only endorsed referencing international law in
the absence of clear domestic law.' However, in Roper and Atkins,
the Court identified a national consensus against the death penalty,
but it still referenced international law in its decisions. 1
36
Yet, the early cases could arguably authorize the Court's recent
references, because although the circumstances surrounding the cases
are different, the Court is using international law in the same way.
The early cases implicated issues that many nations have in common;
these issues may be analogous to those raised in the Court's recent
cases. For example, the Paquete Court quoted Justice Strong, who
said that the law of the sea "'is of universal obligation [and] ... rests
129. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 687-700 (1900) (reviewing other countries'
customs to determine whether fishing vessels could be rightfully captured); Thirty Hogshead of
Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 198 (1815) (stating that rules concerning "neutral rights
which are recognized by all civilized" nations should be respected); see also supra Part B. 1.
130. See supra Part B.1.
131. E.g., Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 2, at 907 ("Historical evidence largely supports
Justice Scalia's claim that foreign sources of law generally are not and should not be relevant to
the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution.").
132. Paquete, 175 U.S. at 686, 700.
133. Thirty Hogshead, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 197-98.
134. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
135. Sanchez, supra note 19, at 197 (stating that courts should only reference international
law "to the extent that United States law did not provide adequate guidance towards resolving the
question at hand").
136. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574, 578 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
576-77 (2003).
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upon the common consent of civilized communities."" 37  In Thirty
Hogshead, the Court emphasized that there are certain laws that are
common to every country and, in those cases, it is appropriate to
consider other countries' laws.'38 It could be argued that the Eighth
Amendment primarily concerns human rights, which is a universal
issue.'39 For example, the issue in Roper-protecting children from
harmful state action-is a social concern that is not distinct to the
United States or its Constitution.4 ° Likewise, protecting citizens
from excessive government intrusion, as the Court did in Lawrence,
is a concern for all countries. 4' Thus, the Court is consistently
applying international law to resolve issues common to all countries.
Early references may also authorize the Court's recent
references, because the early Court never limited its international
references to non-domestic cases.'42 In fact, in Schooner, the early
Court indicated that domestic courts should try to remain consistent
with international law whenever possible, not just in cases that
implicate international law.'43  The Lawrence Court's use of
international law is consistent with Schooner. After it recognized a
right to sexual privacy, the Court reviewed international law to
confirm its conclusion.'" Similarly, in Roper, the Court looked at
international law to confirm domestic disapproval of the juvenile
death penalty.'45 Thus, the recent Court, consistent with Schooner,
has merely ensured consistency with international law.
Additionally, throughout both the early cases and the recent
cases, the Court has only used international law as persuasive
authority.'46 In Thirty Hogshead, for example, the Court noted that it
was not bound to apply the English rule, but could use it to inform its
137. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. (14 Wall.) 677, 711 (1900) (quoting The Scotia, 81 U.S.
170, 187-88 (1871)).
138. Thirty Hogshead of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 198 (1815).
139. See Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 2, at 891-92 (stating that the nature of the Eighth
Amendment implies a community standard).
140. Roper, 543 U.S. at 576.
141. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
142. See supra Part C. 1.
143. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (determining
Congress' intent behind an act, the Court stated that "an act of Congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.").
144. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576-77.
145. Roper, 543 U.S. at 575.
146. See supra Part C.
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ultimate decisions. 147  Analogously, in Roper, the Court stated that
international law was not binding,'
48 as it also did in Atkins. 149
Therefore, international law is playing the same role in recent cases
as it did in early cases.
4. Lower Courts' Use of International Law
Lower federal courts and state courts have generally been
reluctant to follow the Supreme Court's lead in referencing
international law to protect individual rights. 5 ° State courts have
been more willing to look to international law in common law areas
such as tort law.151
A few cases illustrate lower courts' general unwillingness to
follow the Supreme Court's lead in using international law to
interpret constitutional rights.'52 In People v. Brown,'53 the California
Supreme Court was charged with resolving whether sentencing the
defendant to the death penalty constituted cruel and unusual
punishment, an issue that was similar to the issue the Supreme Court
faced in Roper.54  The defendant in Brown argued that the death
penalty was unconstitutional because it violated "international norms
of humanity and decency."' 55 The California Supreme Court rejected
the defendant's references to the International Covenant on Civil and
147. Thirty Hogshead of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 198 (1815).
148. Roper, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
149. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002).
150. DeLaquil, supra note 80, at 698, 701; see also David S. Clark, The Use of Comparative
Law by American Courts, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. SuPP. 23, 23 (1994) (stating that United States
courts rarely cite to foreign law); Alain A. Levasseur & Madeline Herbert, The Use of
Comparative Law by Courts, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. SuPP. 41, 42 (1994) (discussing the fact that
most courts do not consider foreign law relevant).
151. DeLaquil, supra note 80, at 699.
152. See, e.g., Allen v. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 946, 952 n.8 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that a national
consensus must exist before determining what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment).
Generally, state courts have not followed the Supreme Court's lead in referencing international
law in protecting liberty rights. There are a few instances where lower courts have mentioned
international law in similar areas. See Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2005). In
Bockting, the Ninth Circuit, in holding that a defendant's right to cross-examine the witnesses
against him was essential, referenced a Supreme Court case in which Justice Scalia applied
international law in recognizing the right to confront such witnesses. Id. at 1017 n. 1. However,
the Bockting court actually referred to the Supreme Court case in which Justice Scalia applied
international law and not directly to the international law, which is inconsistent with how the
Supreme Court has recently referenced international law.
153. 93 P.3d 244 (Cal. 2004).
154. Id. at 248, 258-59; see supra Part C.2.
155. Brown, 93 P.3d at 248, 258-59.
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Political Rights ("ICCPR") because the United States, though a
signatory to the treaty, "reserve[d] the right ...to impose capital
punishment." '156 The California court held that, because the United
States was not a signatory to that part of the treaty, it was irrelevant
in determining whether the death penalty was unconstitutional.
5 7
This is contrary to the decision in Roper, where the Court based its
decision, in part, on the fact that many other countries were
signatories to Article 37 of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, even though the United States was not. 58
The Mississippi Supreme Court similarly considered whether
the death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment in Jordan
v. Mississippi.'59 There, the defendant filed a petition for post-
conviction relief after he was convicted of two counts of capital
murder and sentenced to death. 6 He alleged, among other things,
that the death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment, in part
because international treaties disfavored it.1 61  The court
acknowledged that the U.S. Constitution and U.S. Supreme Court
cases were relevant in determining cruel and unusual punishment;
however, the court declined to apply Roper, because the defendant
was over 18 at the time he committed the crime. 6 The court also
declined to apply international law at all in resolving the death
penalty's constitutionality. 63
Brown and Jordan are generally indicative of how most lower
courts have responded to the Supreme Court's recent references to
international law."6 Despite lower courts' general reluctance to use
156. Id.
157. Id. at 258-59.
158. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576 (2005).
159. 918 So. 2d 636, 661 (Miss. 2005).
160. Id. at 643-44.
161. Id. at 656 (citing "the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
the American Convention on Human Rights, [and] the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights").
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Delaquil, supra note 80, at 701-02 ("In general, regardless of the type of foreign or
international authority cited, state courts give these arguments a chilly reception."). See generally
People v. Hillhouse, 40 P.3d 754, 782 (Cal. 2002) (rejecting defendant's argument that his death
sentence violated customary international law because the defendant failed to establish that the
death penalty violated state or federal law); Williamson v. State, 175 S.W.3d 522, 524-25 (Tex.
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international law in resolving constitutional rights issues, they have
looked to international law to resolve common law questions such as
tort law. 6 ' For example, in Li v. Yellow Cab,'66 the California court
had to resolve whether contributory negligence was still applicable
or whether it should adopt a comparative negligence system. 6 7 The
court reviewed French law in ultimately resolving to adopt the
comparative negligence system.'68 Similarly, in Capitol Records
Inc., v. Naxos of America, Inc.,'69 the New York court reviewed the
international interpretation of the term publication to determine
whether New York common law provided copyright protection.
7
1
D. The Debate over Reliance on International Law
The response to the Court's independent references to
international law has been fervent. The field has split into two
sides-the Nationalists and the Transnationalists-who disagree on
the propriety of referencing international law to resolve U.S.
constitutional issues.' 7' Nationalists believe courts should not
independently use international law to interpret the Constitution
because its meaning was fixed at the time it was drafted.
72
Transnationalists, on the other hand, believe the Constitution is an
evolving document and that international law is relevant in
App. 2005) (finding that there is no international consensus about consecutive life sentences after
the defendant cited Roper's references to international law to support his argument that the
imposition of three consecutive life sentences constituted cruel and unusual punishment).
165. Delaquil, supra note 80, at 699; see, e.g., Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1047, 1049
(Alaska 1975) (referencing, in deciding to adopt a comparative negligence rule, "other nations of
the civilized Western world" that had adopted that rule); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 115
N.W.2d 618, 622-23 (Wis. 1962) (reviewing the immunity rule for public officials in personal
injury cases, and referencing world opinion on the rule).
166. 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975).
167. Id. at 1236.
168. Id.
169. 830 N.E.2d 250 (N.Y. 2005).
170. Id. at 252, 264 n.9.
171. Benvenuto, supra note 10, at 2698, 2720, 2723.
172. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624, 627 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Benvenuto,
supra note 10, at 2731 ("[F]oreign precedent is immaterial because it is silent on what the
Constitution meant when it was adopted."); Saby Ghoshray, To Understand Foreign Court
Citation: Dissecting Originalism, Dynamicism, Romanticism, and Consequentialism, 69 ALB. L.
REV. 709, 711 (2006) (stating that Justice Scalia believes in the literal meaning of the
Constitution's text, thus, he believes in the "immutability of the Constitution").
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interpreting it.'73 The Supreme Court Justices' opinions surrounding
this issue are just as spirited as scholars' opinions.
1. The Nationalist Backlash to
the Supreme Court's Use of International Law
The backlash from the Supreme Court's recent international law
references has been swift and vocal. 174 In 2004, Representative Tom
Feeney resubmitted a non-binding resolution to the House of
Representatives, which stated that "judicial determinations regarding
the meaning of the laws of the United States should not be based on
judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions.' 75
Representative Feeney expressed the concerns of many others who
believe that the Court's independent references to international law
threaten the independence and sovereignty of the United States. 
176
Various scholars have also reacted strongly to the Court's
actions. One of the biggest problems for Nationalists is that the
Court has not developed a methodology for determining the
appropriate sources of international law to use when resolving
domestic disputes.7 7  With no methodology, a domestic court
(including the Supreme Court) may not inquire into all applicable
material before resolving a dispute and, as a result, may base its
decisions on incomplete or partisan information. 7' For example, in
173. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 587 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("If the meaning of [the Eighth
Amendment] had been frozen when it was originally drafted, it would impose no impediment to
the execution of 7-year-old children today."); Ghoshray, supra note 172, at 712-13 (stating that
Justice Kennedy believes "present day Americans have a better understanding of the meaning of
the Constitution than the Framers themselves did" and Justice Ginsburg believes the Constitution
is "living [and] dynamic"); Ginsburg Lecture, supra note 9, at 5 (noting that taking pride in the
U.S. constitutional system does not mean the United States should be complacent with current
laws and the United States should look to international law to learn from it); Koh, supra note 2, at
53-54 (reasoning that "foreign constitutional precedents aid[] U.S. constitutional interpretation");
Scalia, supra note 14, at 308 (stating that under the "'living Constitution paradigm,"' the Court
looks at current constitutional standards).
174. See generally Dennington, supra note 53, at 270-71 ("Judicial conservatives...
correctly point out that the Court has yet to clearly explain when and why contemporary foreign
legal materials are relevant to interpreting the U.S. Constitution."); Sanchez, supra note 19, at
187 (identifying "vehement criticisms of the Court" in response to its recent international law
references).
175. H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005).
176. Press Release, United States Cong. House of Rep., Feeney/Goodlatte Resolution
Addresses Supreme Court Importation of International Law (July 19, 2005), http://
www.house.gov/list/press/fl24 feeney/IntLawRes.shtml.
177. Glensy, supra note 8, at 359-60.
178. See Alford, supra note 9, at 64-65.
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Lawrence, "it was the mere fact that other nations ... had accepted
the right the petitioners sought that the Court deemed important," but
the Court did not look at the reasoning behind international law to
understand why the world community did or did not support sexual
privacy rights. 79  Consequently, a party may exert considerable
influence over a court's decision by selectively referencing only the
international law that is most favorable to that party's position. 8 '
Moreover, without a methodology for sifting through the
available sources, a domestic court is unlikely to have the tools
necessary to evaluate whether a particular international law reference
is appropriate. Therefore, the court may be relying on inappropriate
or irrelevant information. 8' Not only could this lead to erroneous
conclusions, it could create inconsistencies between decisions.'82 If
there is no defined method of identifying the pertinent law from the
appropriate source(s), then each court may develop its own methods
based on its own historical approach, which would in turn cause
varied results.'83  These varied results could encourage forum
shopping as claimants realize that they could receive different results
on the same claim in different courts.
8 4
Another problem that stems from not having an established
methodology is that judges gain too much discretion.8 5 Without
179. See Larsen, supra note 9, at 1297; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 623 (2005)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority accepted at face value that every foreign country
had prohibited the death penalty but looked no further to see whether some of these nations had a
mandatory death penalty for some crimes, a policy that is contrary to U.S. democratic ideals);
Wilkinson, supra note 10, at 426 (stating that when judges rely on international law in their
decisions "they move the bases for judicial decision-making even farther from . . . popular
acceptance").
180. Alford, supra note 9, at 64-65 (arguing that the amicus briefs the Court relied on in
Lawrence did not mention that homosexual rights are still not recognized in many countries); see
also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the
majority "ignor[ed] ... the many countries that ha[d] retained criminal prohibitions on sodomy").
181. Alford, supra note 9, at 64-65 (stating that the Lawrence Court expressly relied on an
amicus brief that stated that most nations had abolished sodomy laws, but failed to recognize
other reports not cited in the amicus brief that indicated that there was very little protection for
gay and lesbian rights worldwide).
182. See Sanchez, supra note 19, at 225.
183. Id.
184. See ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES AND PROBLEMS
436 (2003).
185. See Donald J. Kochan, Sovereignty and the American Courts at the Cocktail Party of
International Law: The Dangers of Domestic Judicial Invocations of Foreign and International
Law, 29 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 507, 509-10 (2006); see also Sanchez, supra note 19, at 190
(stating that because international law is "so vast and diverse," a judge can find law to support
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appropriate constraints, judges are essentially able to "cherry-pick"' 86
laws that comport with their personal beliefs and incorporate these
personal preferences into their decisions.'87 Thus, judges are
essentially able to create the "content to the domestic Constitution"
according to their own beliefs.' For example, the Court in Roe v.
Wade'89 chose not to reference international law to resolve
reproductive rights, but the Court chose to reference international
law to recognize a right to sexual privacy. 9 ° Selective, unprincipled
use of international law will impact the Court's legitimacy. 9'
When judges selectively pick issues based on their personal
beliefs that certain rights are more worthy of protection than others,
judges cross into law-making and violate the separation of powers
doctrine. 9 2  When a court resolves a dispute, its resolution and the
reasoning behind it become precedent for future courts.'93 Therefore,
when a court uses international law to resolve a dispute, it is creating
any belief); Wilkinson, supra note 10, at 428 (stating that because of the "number and type of
countries to consider," judges may not be able to identify appropriate sources of international
law).
186. Kochan, supra note 185, at 509.
187. Id. at 509-10 (referencing Chief Justice Roberts' statement that a court can find anything
it is looking for by searching all countries); see also Larsen, supra note 9, at 1295-97 (stating that
the majority of the Court is merely looking to adopt particular beliefs when it references
international law, and is just searching through international law in support of these particular
beliefs); Sanchez, supra note 19, at 225 ("[B]ecause of the lack of neutral legal guidance... how
else may judges refer to foreign legal sources but on the basis of some . . . subjective whim...
?").
188. Larsen, supra note 9, at 1296.
189. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
190. Alford, supra note 9, at 67 (noting that "international sources are proposed for
comparison only if they are viewed as rights enhancing" and are ignored when they reduce civil
liberties).
191. Sanchez, supra note 19, at 216 (stating that making unprincipled decisions will weaken
the Court's legitimacy); see also Alford, supra note 9, at 69 (stating that "[s]elective utilization of
international sources" will be unpersuasive to the public); Kochan, supra note 185, at 509
(arguing that by allowing judges "to cherry-pick from laws around the world to define and
interpret their laws at home, activism is emboldened and the rule of law is diminished.");
Wilkinson, supra note 10, at 426 (stating that judges' reliance on international law affect their
legitimacy).
192. Kochan, supra note 185, at 538-39 (stating that referencing foreign law "deviates from
the traditional role of ... the judicia[ry] in the U.S. system."); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1
(vesting the legislative powers in Congress); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (vesting the executive power
in the President of the United States of America); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (stating that the
judiciary is a branch of limited jurisdiction); Larsen, supra note 9, at 1316-19 ("Foreign policy
decisions have always been understood to be the domain of the political branches .....
193. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 700 (8th ed. 2004).
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law that future courts are bound to follow. 19 4 However, "the United
States is a country of limited, defined, and enumerated powers with
elected branches that create laws and a judiciary that is limited to
interpreting [those laws]."'95 By using international law, the Court
and other domestic courts are circumventing the legislative branch,
the branch designated by the Constitution to make law;'96 they are
essentially deciding what the law should be and not what the law
is. 197
By using international law to circumvent the democratic
process, a court will also diminish the sovereign power of the United
States.'98 As a sovereign, a nation creates and enforces its own
laws. "'99 However, "'[t]o the extent that a state is subject to law made
elsewhere, it has lost its sovereignty.""'2 °  When a court uses
international law to resolve domestic disputes, it is allowing another
nation to affect U.S. law, thereby undermining U.S. sovereign
power.20 ' As a result, U.S. citizens who vote to implement particular
laws or who elect persons to create those laws will lose some of their
voice in the democratic process, thus undermining the notion of
democratic governance.0 2
Laws made in other countries reflect those countries' historical
foundations, legal systems, and local environments.2 3 They are not
194. Id.
195. Kochan, supra note 185, at 513, 539-40 (stating that it is the "duty of the judiciary to
decide what the law is, not what it should be"); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 622-23
(2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority overstepped its constitutional (branch)
power when it referenced the fact that the United States is one of the few nations that has not
ratified Article 37 because the legislative and executive branch, who have the power to ratify
treaties, have chosen not to ratify Article 37).
196. Benvenuto, supra note 10, at 2733 ("In a democracy, it is problematic for unelected
judges to invalidate laws which are enacted by the people's democratically elected
representatives."); see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
197. Kochan, supra note 185, at 513.
198. Id. at 511-12.
199. Id. at 511-12, 540.
200. Id. at 541 (citing T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Thinking Outside the Sovereignty Box:
Transnational Law and the U.S. Constitution, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1989, 1992-93 (2004)).
201. Id. at512,541.
202. Id. at 547-48; see also Alford, supra note 9, at 59 ("[W]hen a legislative or executive act
is declared unconstitutional, it thwarts the will of the people and undermines the values of the
prevailing majority.").
203. See Dennington, supra note 53, at 281 (implying that contemporary foreign legal
materials may not be appropriate as interpretive aides because they reflect foreign legal cultures
that may differ significantly from the U.S. legal culture); Sanchez, supra note 19, at 190
("Foreign laws . . . stem from . . . different circumstances, philosophies, traditions, and
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necessarily founded on the same policies as U.S. laws. 4 For
example, constitutional measures such as bicameralism and
presentment control the enactment of a U.S. law, but another
country's laws are not necessarily subject to the same constitutional
limitations."' Thus, a judge who references international law may
reference a law that does not have the same institutional protections
as a U.S. law. Additionally, a law reflects a society's characteristics,
and a judge who references international law on a purely domestic
issue is essentially applying irrelevant law to resolve a U.S. claim." 6
For example, what if the European prohibition on the juvenile death
penalty were born from a more negative history than that of the
United States, such as a previous excessive use of the death
penalty?0 7 Under these circumstances, the European death penalty
system may no longer be viewed as more advanced. 8 That may
have affected the Court's analysis in Roper."9
2. The Transnationalist Response
Although there has been significant backlash in response to the
Supreme Court's citations to international law, Transnationalists
embrace it. They argue that independently referencing international
law is not a "new phenomenon" for the Court;210 therefore, arguments
that current international law references are inconsistent with the
American legal principles are unfounded. Since the Court has
ideas .... "); see also Scalia-Breyer Debate, supra note 14, at 521, 526 (stating that using foreign
law to determine the content of the Constitution is not appropriate because, Justice Scalia argues,
the United States does not have the "same moral and legal framework as the rest of the world").
204. E.g., Alford, supra note 9, at 64 (stating that international sources should be one of the
last sources of information in comparative analysis because they do not reflect "our own national
experience").
205. Kochan, supra note 185, at 542.
206. Sanchez, supra note 19, at 216; see also Alford, supra note 9, at 63-64 ("At most...
international sources offer delocalized, independent moral and political arguments that...
deserve a status at the bottom of the hierarchy of the interpretative canon[] below domestic value
judgments ....").
207. Sanchez, supra note 19, at 227-28.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 226-28.
210. See Glensy, supra note 8, at 359; see also Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 2, at 755
(stating that it is wrong to say the Court has never relied on international law); supra Part C. 1.
211. Glensy, supra note 8, at 361-62 (arguing that it is inaccurate to say that international law
citations are far from the mainstream); see also Arvin, supra note 51, at 218 (acknowledging that
the majority in Roper was being consistent with the Court's history of referencing international
law in such cases as Schooner and Paquete); Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 2, at 755 ("[T]hose
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always looked to international law, it is inaccurate to say that the
Court is trying to expand its power by referencing international
law.'12  Early precedent sets the foundation for the belief that the
Founders intended domestic courts to be able to reference
international law.2 3  Additionally, any increased frequency of
references to international law can be explained by the fact that
communication between legal systems is much easier now.1 4
Therefore, any relative lack of earlier references to international law,
other than references to English common law-the system from
which the U.S. system evolved-is not indicative of the fact that the
Framers denounced such references.2 5
In fact, early case law indicated that U.S. decisions should be
consistent with international law whenever possible.2 6  Thus, early
Supreme Court decisions looked favorably upon the use of
international law as persuasive authority to ensure consistency with
international law, even in cases without any international law
implications. 7 It would be inconsistent with precedent if the Court
did not reference international law.21 8 In fact, it would be out of
political and journalistic commentators who say that the Court has never before cited or relied
upon foreign law are clearly and demonstrably wrong.").
212. See Glensy, supra note 8, at 361-62; Koh, supra note 2, at 44 ("[T]he early Supreme
Court saw the judicial branch as a central channel for making international law part of U.S.
law."); Darlene S. Wood, In Defense of Transjudicialism, 44 DUQ. L. REV. 93, 115 (2005)
("[R]eliance on foreign law is not new, and if past performance is the strongest indicator of future
conduct, we have nothing to fear from this or any future court.").
213. Glensy, supra note 8, at 364.
214. Id. (stating that "practical communications difficulties" explain why the Court did not
apply international law early on); see also Ginsburg, Lecture, supra note 9, at 3 ("Today, tools are
readily at hand to pursue international and comparative law inquiries.").
215. See Glensy, supra note 8, at 364 ("Other than English common law ... there simply was
not much foreign law available to the judges of those early years from which to derive
comparative reasoning.").
216. See Murray v. Schooner, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
217. Glensy, supra note 8, at 365; Sanchez, supra note 19, at 195-96. See generally The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (holding that "[i]ntemational law is part of our law");
Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 270-271 (1808) (looking at English court decisions in
determining whether U.S. courts should examine foreign courts' jurisdiction over claims);
Schooner, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118.
218. See Koh, supra note 2, at 45 (stating that "[flrom the beginning ... American courts
regularly took judicial notice of both international law and foreign law ...when construing
American law."); see also Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 2, at 755; Glensy, supra note 8, at
366 ("Within fifty years of the founding of the nation, the U.S. Supreme Court had embarked on
an interpretative enterprise that allowed for the use of comparative law derived from foreign
sources.").
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character for the Court not to do so.219 Moreover, the Court's non-
binding international law references are no different from the
references to other non-binding materials it uses for fact-gathering
and informational purposes, such as amicus briefs and other domestic
courts' decisions.220
Early cases also define the Court's appropriate role as the head
of the judicial branch. The Court has always played a role in the
making of laws and in shaping their interpretation and meaning.22'
Proponents point to Marbury v. Madison 22 in which Justice Marshall
illuminated the scope of the judiciary's power. In Marbury, Justice
Marshall held that it is the enumerated duty of the judiciary "to say
what the law is. '223  The judiciary does create law, because it must
interpret a rule before applying it, and that interpretation essentially
creates the law's contents. 24 Similarly, if two laws conflict, it is a
court's duty to determine which of the laws to give effect in light of
the Constitution.25  The exercise of this duty also constitutes law-
making.226
219. See Koh, supra note 2, at 45 (stating that to "ignore international law . . . would
constitute a stunning reversal of history"); see also Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 2, at 755;
Glensy, supra note 8, at 366.
220. Shirley S. Abrahamson & Michael J. Fischer, All the World's a Courtroom: Judging in
the New Millennium, 26 HOFSTRA L. REv. 273, 287 (1997) ("[F]oreign opinions could function
like superstar amicus briefs, offering otherwise unavailable viewpoints, delivered from unique
perspectives, by some of the world's leading legal minds."). See generally Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 578 (2003) (stating that the "opinion of the world community, while not controlling
our outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions.");
Larsen, supra note 9, at 1299-1300 (stating that it is appropriate to look to international law to
see how a rule will work; to gather information necessary to decide a particular question, as court
did in Glucksburg, as it seems no different than looking to a law of another state to gather
evidence); Scalia-Breyer Debate, supra note 14, at 523 (Justice Breyer stating, "If I have a
difficult case and a human being called a judge, though of a different country, has had to consider
a similar problem, why should I not read what that judge has said? It will not bind me, but I may
learn something.").
221. See Scalia-Breyer Debate, supra note 14, at 522 (Justice Breyer acknowledging that,
even though the courts play a limited role in the democratic process, they still participate in it);
Koh, supra note 2, at 44 ("[T]he judicial branch [was seen] as a central channel for making
international law part of U.S. law.").
222. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
223. Id. at 177.
224. Id. at 177-78.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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The Court in Hilton v. Guyot?27 also outlined the court's
functions in determining the meaning of laws.228 In addition to
identifying international law as part of American law, the Hilton
Court identified the duty of the judiciary to "ascertain[] and declar[e]
what the law is ... in order to determine the rights of [the] parties to
suits regularly before them. ' 29 The Court held that, even absent any
domestic law on an issue, a court must still determine the parties'
rights and can look to international law to try to resolve that claim.23 °
Therefore, proponents argue, the Court is not overstepping its power
in its recent cases and is acting consistently with its judicial role.23'
Additionally, they note that legislatures always retain power to pass
laws overriding a court's decisions, thereby maintaining their
legislative function.232
Independently referencing international law is also appropriate
because it is consistent with the judiciary's power to reference other
jurisdictions as non-binding authority. 233 Domestic courts routinely
reference other jurisdictions' laws independently without violating
any legal foundations.234 For example, in Balmer v. Elan Corp.,235
227. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
228. Id. at 123.
229. Id. at 163.
230. Id. at 162 (holding that international law "must be ascertained and administered by the
courts of justice, as often as such questions are presented in litigation between man and man, duly
submitted to their determination").
231. See Koh, supra note 2, at 44-45; Scalia-Breyer Debate, supra note 14, at 522.
232. See Fontana, supra note 105, at 475.
233. See Glensy, supra note 8, at 366-67; see also Benvenuto, supra note 10, at 2697 ("[T]he
Supreme Court's use of foreign precedent is largely inconsequential to its decisions."); Ginsburg,
Discussion, supra note 18, at 1042 (stating that international law "doesn't bind us any more than
a decision of, say, the New Jersey Supreme Court would bind the Connecticut Supreme
Court .... But we have something to learn from the quality of the reasoning in an opinion on a
question similar to a question that confronts us."); Sanchez, supra note 19, at 185 (stating that the
Court has recently invoked international law as persuasive authority).
234. See Abrahamson & Fischer, supra note 220, at 276; see also Rebecca Leflar, A
Comparison of Comparison: Use of Foreign Case Law as Persuasive Authority by the United
States Supreme Court, The Supreme Court of Canada and The High Court of Australia, 11 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 165, 168 (2001) (stating that "American jurists are generally experienced
comparativists" because they engage in comparisons of different states' laws). See generally
Guam v. Ojeda, 758 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that "where Guam law is unclear,"
California cases are persuasive authority); Kresha v. Kresha, 344 N.W.2d 906, 910 (Neb. 1984)
(holding that, absent statutory law, it is appropriate to look at other states' court decisions as
persuasive authority in resolving cases before the Nebraska courts); Oneida County Fair Bd. v.
Smylie, 386 P.2d 374, 391 (Idaho 1963) (holding that "[i]n cases of first impression ...we
recognize that the decisions from sister states are not controlling [but this court may consider
them] as an aid in arriving at its decision"); Nat'l Indem. Co. v. Spring Branch State Bank, 348
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former Elan employees sued their employer for wrongful termination
after their employer told them that cooperating with an FDA
investigation would not adversely affect them.236 The Georgia court,
in deciding whether oral promises modifying at-will employment
were enforceable, looked to other states for resolution, because there
was no Georgia precedent on point.237 The court acknowledged that
it was not obligated to look at foreign authority and that it was not
bound by other jurisdictions' decisions. 38
One of the reasons a court may look to another state's case
decisions or laws is to see the practical effects of implementing a
particular kind of statute. Proponents argue that international law
presents the same opportunity for domestic courts to gather practical
evidence.239 U.S. courts can look at international law to see how
particular rules may work in particular systems or social
environments, the types of problems associated with particular rules,
and possible solutions to legal issues not previously discovered.24 °
"[O]ther countries... may have obtained a better insight into
constitutional problems... ."24 Referencing international law may
thus present U.S. courts with a range of possible solutions and "the
practical effects of the[se] solutions." '242
Understanding another country's laws may also help increase
the United States' understanding of that country generally, which in
turn may help to improve the relationship between the two
S.W.2d 528, 531 (Tex. 1961) (acknowledging that Supreme Court of Colorado decisions were not
binding on it, but using them as persuasive authority in ultimately following the minority rule).
235. 599 S.E.2d 158 (Ga. 2004).
236. Id. at 160.
237. Id. at 161.
238. Id.
239. See Benvenuto, supra note 10, at 2726; Larsen, supra note 9, at 1300.
240. Benvenuto, supra note 10, at 2726; Leflar, supra note 234, at 168-69 (stating that
American courts should engage in international comparativism because they can learn from other
countries, as they do when they look at other states' laws); Scalia-Breyer Debate (Justice Breyer),
supra note 14, at 523 (arguing that foreign cases involve judges working through similar legal
problems, and applying texts similar to the U.S. Constitution).
241. See Glensy, supra note 8, at 387; see also United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 468-69
(2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (arguing that U.S. courts should look at international
law to learn from it because the United States is no longer the only country engaging in
"constitutional judicial review").
242. See Benvenuto, supra note 10, at 2726-28; see also Fontana, supra note 105, at 483 ("As
we learn more about how other countries handle situations, it will expand the range of
possibilities we consider in our law.").
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countries. 243 The United States must pay respect to other democratic
nations who have cited to its Supreme Court opinions or it risks
being isolated from the international community. 2" Scholars argue,
for example, that other countries may view the United States as
hypocritical if it holds itself out as a human rights protector but
offers less protection for those rights domestically.2 45 This will affect
the United States' legitimacy in the eyes of the international
community.246
Many commentators also presume that U.S. law is superior to
foreign law, but some scholars question whether that presumption is
always valid.247 For example, in Roper, the United States was one of
the few nations that had not ratified the treaty prohibiting the death
penalty for children.2 48  This might indicate that the United States is
243. Fontana, supra note 105, at 483 ("As we learn more about how other countries handle
situations... [i]t will increase our understanding of these countries and hence improve our
relationships with them."); see also Wu, supra note 27 (stating that referencing international law
is a "useful courtesy").
244. See Jeffrey Toobin, How Anthony Kennedy's Passion for Foreign Law Could Change
the Supreme Court, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 12, 2005, at 42, 42; see also Benvenuto, supra note
10, at 2728 (referencing scholars' views that failing to engage in international dialogue isolates
the United States); Levasseur & Herbert, supra note 8, at 41 ("'Today there is no excuse not to
learn from others. It would be arrogant ... to hold out U.S. law as a model for legal reform...
and to refuse to recognize that other legal systems have much to offer the United States."'
(quoting James R. Maxeiner, 1992: High Time for American Lawyers to Learn from Europe or
Roscoe Pound's 1906 Address Revisited, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1, 5 (1991))).
245. See Larsen, supra note 9, at 1316-17 (stating that Transnationalists see "the risk of
perceived hypocrisy, as the United States acts on the one hand as an outspoken champion of
human rights . . . while on the other hand refusing to employ the full measure of international
human rights law at home. The consequence . . . is that the United States will lose its moral
authority in the field of human rights and thus its ability to foster human rights abroad");
Strossen, supra note 36, at 826-27 ("U.S. government officials profess outrage when
international human rights norms are violated, and on occasion manifest this outrage in concrete
terms [and] [t]o deny international human rights norms. .. could seem hypocritical .... ).
246. Larsen, supra note 9, at 1316-17 ("To deny international human'rights norms.., could
seem hypocritical in view of the U.S. insistence that other nations directly adopt and enforce such
norms." (citing Strossen, supra note 36, at 825-27)); Randall Murphy, The Framers'
Evolutionary Perception of Rights: Using International Human Rights Norms as Source for
Discovery of Ninth Amendment Rights, 21 STETSON L. REv. 423, 462-63 (2005) ("If the courts
chose not to embrace international human rights norms as a source of guidance concerning
fundamental human rights ... the United States would lose the high moral ground when citing
human rights violations by other nations.").
247. H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005); see also Arvin, supra note 51, at 209 ("A global
movement has emerged that rejects capital punishment [but] the United States has not embraced
this movement as fully .... ). But see Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 625-26 (2005) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (stating that the United States is "one of only six countries that allow abortion"
until viability, providing more protection than most of the international community).
248. Roper, 543 U.S. at 576; Arvin, supra note 51, at 209.
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no longer the most progressive nation when it comes to protecting
human rights. 49
3. The Split of Opinion on the Supreme Court
Many Supreme Court justices have identified themselves with
one side or the other in the debate over independent use of
international law. On the present Court, Justices Scalia and Thomas
have disfavored international law references. On the other side,
Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg and Breyer have all favored
referencing international law to some degree. Additionally, former
Justice O'Connor was vocal in her support of international law
references. Yet, it remains to be seen how the new Court, with Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, will address international law
references as persuasive authority.
The most vocal Nationalist on the Court has been Justice Scalia,
who has been joined in many of his dissenting opinions by Justice
Thomas and former Chief Justice Rehnquist.25 In the Eighth
Amendment cases, Justice Scalia has condemned the majority's
international law citations, arguing that the Court has overstepped its
constitutional role by referencing international law."' He argues that
legislatures, and not courts, should be arbiters of the moral values of
society, because only legislatures have the power-given to them by
the Constitution-to answer to the people's will.252  Courts should
only interpret statutes passed by the legislature.253 Therefore, the
Court overstepped its power by circumventing the national consensus
that supported the juvenile death penalty when it referenced
249. Arvin, supra note 51, at 213 ("[T]he international community has consistently outpaced
the United States in abolishing death penalty practices, and [has resulted in] the consequential
alienation of the United States .... ").
250. See Benvenuto, supra note 10, at 2720-21; see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 607 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321, 322, 324 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
("The Court's suggestion that [foreign laws] are relevant to the constitutional question finds little
support in our precedents .... " "[L]egislat[ion] . . . ought to be the sole indicator[] by which
courts ascertain the contemporary American concept[s] of decency for purposes of the Eighth
Amendment."); Sanchez, supra note 19, at 186 ("Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas
have generally decried this practice [of referencing international law] as inappropriate under most
circumstances.").
251. Scalia, supra note 14, at 307-08, 310.
252. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 616 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
253. See Scalia, supra note 14, at 310; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 603-04 (2003)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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international law to overturn the juvenile death penalty.254 Justice
Scalia contended that the majority, in holding that the juvenile death
penalty was unconstitutional, imposed its own personal beliefs.
255
In the liberty rights cases, Justice Scalia has rejected the
majority's premise that American law should be consistent with the
laws of the rest of the world because the Court's previous decisions
have been inconsistent with this premise.256 For example, the Court's
interpretation of the Establishment Clause does not reflect
international views.257  Because the Court has not developed a
principled approach for referencing international law, Justice Scalia
argues that allowing judges to reference international law will allow
them to subjectively pick the situations in which they will apply
international law.258  This unprincipled approach will create a
slippery slope, allowing courts, at their will, to increase or decrease
individual rights protections.259
Justice Scalia does believe that there are some instances where
referencing international law is appropriate. For example, he has no
problem applying international law when a treaty is in place or when
a federal statute points to international law.26° In this circumstance,
he believes it is appropriate to reference another court's
interpretation of that treaty.26  Moreover, he argues that is
appropriate for courts to reference old English cases and opinions,
because the Framers referenced these cases and opinions in drafting
the Constitution; thus, these early cases are relevant in interpreting
the Constitution.262 However, Scalia believes that "modem foreign
254. Roper, 543 U.S. at 608-09, 622 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
255. Id. at 629.
256. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Ghoshray, supra note 172, at
712 (noting that Justice Scalia rejects the notion of trying to gain international approval of U.S.
law).
257. Roper, 543 U.S. at 625 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
258. Scalia, supra note 14, at 309; see also Ghoshray, supra note 172, at 722-23
(acknowledging that "Justice Scalia's distaste for judicial activism" has impacted his opinion of
recent international law references).
259. Dennington, supra note 53, at 271 ("[B]ecause the Court fails to tell us when foreign law
is relevant and when it is not, there is no limiting principle that would prevent a future Court from
one day citing contemporary foreign legal practices to restrict, rather than expand, domestic civil
rights and civil liberties ....").
260. See Scalia, supra note 14, at 305; supra Part B.
261. Scalia, supra note 14, at 305.
262. Id. at 306.
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legal materials can never be relevant to an interpretation of ... the
U.S. Constitution.
12 63
Many of the justices that support independent references to
international law, those grouped into the Transnationalist camp,
believe it is appropriately applied only in certain instances.2 ' They
proffer that independent international law is appropriately applied
only when it is not dispositive in any case involving purely domestic
issues. These Justices essentially believe that independent
international law should be used only for informational purposes, as
a yardstick against which court decisions based on national law
should be measured to confirm those decisions' adequacy. For
example, Justice Breyer recognizes that international law, absent a
treaty, convention, or statute, is not binding on American courts, but
may raise similar issues and concerns from which the United States
can learn from. 265  Additionally, Justice O'Connor in her Roper
dissent stated that it was appropriate to reference international law in
Eighth Amendment cases; however, because there was no national
consensus, the majority should not have held that the juvenile death
penalty violated the Eighth Amendment, regardless of the
international consensus.2 66 The notion that independent references to
international law are appropriately used as persuasive authority is
also reflected in many recent majority opinions, which have
acknowledged that international law references are "not controlling
[over] the outcome" of any domestic case. 67
Acknowledging that international law is not binding authority in
purely domestic cases, Transnationalist justices believe that there
still is value in surveying international law. Specifically, they cite
the Transnationalist argument that international law can be a
valuable educational tool for domestic courts. Justice Breyer
263. Id. at 307.
264. Benvenuto, supra note 10, at 2723-25.
265. Scalia-Breyer Debate, supra note 14, at 522-23.
266. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 604-05 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
267. Id. at 578; see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (contending
international law only confirms a decision already made based on U.S. law); Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 379-80 (1989) (stating that only American standards of decency are
dispositive).
268. Scalia-Breyer Debate, supra note 14, at 522-23; see also Glensy, supra note 8, at 387
(stating that the U.S. can benefit from "reverse feedback" because other countries may have better
solutions to constitutional problems); Larsen, supra note 9, at 1289-90 (stating that the
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believes that there are "common legal problems" countries face and
that the United States can learn from international courts when faced
with these issues.269 Justice Breyer, writing separately for the dissent
in Printz v. United States,70 looked to Germany and Switzerland,
who had similar federal systems to the United States, to see how they
have tried to resolve particular federalism concerns.27' Justice Breyer
acknowledged that "there may be relevant political and structural
differences between [other countries'] systems and our own," but he
also acknowledged that "their experience may ... cast an empirical
light on the consequences of different solutions to a common legal
problem. 2 7  Justice Kennedy similarly argues that with the
availability of "global sources of [international] information,"
although international law is not binding on American courts, it does
not mean that domestic courts can ignore it.273  Justice Ginsburg
supports Justice Kennedy's statement, acknowledging that the United
States should have an insular perspective, but should look to
international law to learn from other countries. 74 She thinks it is
important for the United States to learn from other nations just as
they have learned from U.S. decisions.2 75 The Framers learned from
foreign countries when they created the U.S. Constitution, and the
United States should continue learning from the international
community.2 76 Additionally, she argues, the United States can look
to international law to see if America's stance on an issue is
Glucksburg Court's review of a Dutch rule to see the effects of legalizing physician-assisted
suicide was appropriate); supra notes 235-239.
269. Ghoshray, supra note 172, at 712, 737-38; see also Scalia-Breyer Debate, supra note 14,
at 523; Stephen Breyer, Assoc. Justice U.S. Supreme Court, The Supreme Court and the New
International Law (April 4, 2003), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp-04-
04-03.html.
270. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
271. Id. at 976.
272. Id. at 977.
273. See Toobin, supra note 244.
274. Ghoshray, supra note 172, at 713; see also Ginsburg, Discussion, supra note 18, at 1041
("A wise parent knows she can learn from her children .. "); Ginsburg, Lecture, supra note 9, at
5 (stating that it is okay to take pride in the U.S. constitutional system, but that does not mean the
United States should not look at international law).
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reasonable in the world; if there is a right recognized by the world,
then it would just strengthen American belief in that right.277
Justices who support international law references also find
support from former Justice O'Connor. 7 Justice O'Connor believes
that globalization and a world economy are an impetus for the United
States to develop a more global legal system. 9  She argues that
because nations are interconnected economically, it would help
economic and diplomatic relations if U.S. courts were to reference
international law in the same way international courts reference U.S.
Supreme Court decisions. 8 Justice O'Connor ultimately posits that
while international law is "rarely binding upon our decisions,
conclusions reached by other countries and by the international
community should.., constitute persuasive background in American
courts."2 '' Justice O'Connor argues that the appropriateness of using
international law as persuasive authority is a firmly established
principle in the U.S. legal system, stemming from such early cases as
Schooner."'
Justices' opinions on referencing international law coincide with
their opinions on constitutional interpretation.283  For example,
Justice Scalia identifies himself as an originalist who believes the
meaning of the Constitution should be determined from the original
text and case law and text in existence at the time the Constitution
was drafted.284 Therefore, he believes it is only appropriate to
reference early English common law cases, because they were in
existence at the time the Constitution was drafted and they
influenced the Framers of the Constitution; however, current
international law should have no influence in the Constitution's
interpretation.285 Other justices, like Justice Ginsburg, reject the idea
277. Ginsburg, Lecture, supra note 9, at 9-10.
278. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 604-05 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
279. Sandra Day O'Connor, Foreword to DAVID J. BEDERMAN WITH CHRISTOPHER J.
BORGEN & DAVID A. MARTIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES, at xix, xx
(Foundation Press 2003) [hereinafter O'Connor, Foreword].
280. Id.
281. Id. at xx.
282. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804); O'Connor,
Foreword, supra note 279, at xx, xxi.
283. See Benvenuto, supra note 10, at 2732; Ghoshray, supra note 172, at 711-16.
284. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 626 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
285. Id. at 626, 630 (contending it is appropriate to interpret the meaning of Constitution by
referencing 18th century "English law and legal thought" because that was the framework at the
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that the Constitution should be determined by looking to the original
meaning only; she thinks the Constitution is "living [and]
dynamic. '"286 Therefore, she believes the Constitution should be read
to reflect current understandings, not just understandings that existed
at the time of the Framers.287 Like Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer
believes that the Constitution should not be interpreted by
referencing its original text alone.2 88 Additionally, Justice Kennedy
believes that "present day Americans have a better understanding of
the meaning of the Constitution than the Framers themselves did.
2 89
His interpretation is "not bottled in the settled traditions and literal
interpretations" of the Constitution.29" These justices believe it is
appropriate to reference international law as persuasive authority in
interpreting the Constitution.
4. The Third Option: Is Some
Use of International Law Appropriate?
Some commentators have advocated a middle ground,
suggesting that it is appropriate to independently reference
international law in some, but not all, circumstances. For example,
Benvenuto, adopting Judge Posner's argument, states that
international law references are appropriate for informational
purposes but not as a basis for a court's decisions.91 Benvenuto
distinguishes informational use from persuasive authority, defining
informational use as referencing international law for valuable facts
or knowledge "rather than as support for the court's decision or
rationales. 292 Benvenuto acknowledges that it is a fine line between
using international law as an informational source and using it as
time Constitution was drafted, but if the meaning of the Constitution is determined by current
standards and opinions, the reasoning behind decisions would become unreliable and would
create instability); Scalia, supra note 14, at 306 (using English cases from 1791 to interpret the
Constitution is appropriate because it reflects the Framers' intent at the time the Constitution was
drafted).
286. Ghoshray, supra note 172, at 713; see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 587 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("[O]ur understanding of the Constitution does change from time to time[, a notion
that] has been [long] settled ....").
287. Ghoshray, supra note 172, at 713.
288. Id. at 712.
289. Id. at 712-13.
290. Id. at 731.
291. Benvenuto, supra note 10, at 2697, 2741, 2754-59.
292. Id. at 2741, 2755.
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persuasive authority.293 Using international law as a "point of
contrast" or to show the results of a particular type of rule would be
an informational use, while using international law as additional
support or confirmation of a court's decisions would be a persuasive
use.29 4 He argues that using international law as a source of argument
or for "helpful or interesting facts," rather than as support for the
Court's decisions or rationales, would strike a compromise between
Nationalists and Transnationalists.295  Nationalists may favor
informational use, because courts would not use international law to
invalidate domestic laws.296 Thus, the use of international law would
not overcome the democratic will of the people.297 Transnationalists
might also be in favor of informational references, because domestic
courts would still have the chance to learn from international law.298
Benvenuto's view that "informational" use would be appropriate
is similar to Larsen's view of appropriate uses of international law.299
One appropriate use of international law is what she terms
"expository" uses, in which the Court "uses [a] foreign law rule to
contrast and thereby explain a domestic constitutional rule.""3 °
Another appropriate use is "empirical" use, in which the Court looks
to international law or opinion to see a proposed rule's effect but
arrives at its decision from domestic sources only.3"' Larsen
identifies the Court's international law reference in Washington v.
Glucksberg °2 as an appropriate reference.3"3 The Glucksburg Court
looked at a Dutch rule allowing physician-assisted suicide to
determine what the consequences might be if the same rule existed in
293. Benvenuto, supra note 10, at 2757.
294. Id. at 2757-58.
295. Id. at 2754-55, 2757; see also Fontana, supra note 105, at 448 (stating that referencing
international law does not need to be an "all or nothing" approach, and it is not inappropriate to
reference international law as an educational tool).
296. Benvenuto, supra note 10, at 2757.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 2741.
300. Larsen, supra note 9, at 1288.
301. Id. at 1289; see also Scalia-Breyer Debate, supra note 14, at 526 ("Of course, you can
cite foreign law to show ... that if the Court adopts this particular view of the Constitution, the
sky will not fall.").
302. 521 U.S. 702, 785 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).
303. Larsen, supra note 9, at 1289-90.
1446
Summer 2007] REFERENCING INTERNATIONAL LAW
the United States.3" However, Larsen says that it is not appropriate
to reference international law in what she terms substantive or
"moral fact-finding" cases, where the Court looks to international
law to determine "the substantive content of the constitutional
rule.""3 5 The problem with the "moral fact-finding" approach, Larsen
explains, is that the Court only looks to the results of international
cases, not to the reasoning behind these cases." 6 By looking only to
the end result and not the reasoning behind the result, judges are
merely referencing international law to support their personal
opinions.3"7
Alford, unlike Benvenuto and Larsen, argues that the way the
Court has applied international law in some of its recent Eighth
Amendment cases is appropriate. 8 Alford argues that the Court's
international law reference in Atkins illustrates how international law
is appropriately used, because the Court's ruling was based on a
national consensus, and international law just happened to be
consistent with the national consensus.3 9 American standards of
decency should be dispositive in determining whether the Eighth
Amendment has been violated, and international law is only relevant
to clarify whether "a prohibition is implicit in ordered liberty and not
simply an 'accidental' national consensus."3 ' The Atkins Court
appropriately used international law, using a national consensus as
the basis for overturning the death penalty and only using
international standards "as an additional check on the Eighth
Amendment." '' Alford argues international law should never be
"binding and operative" over the Court's final decision.3"2
E. Conclusion
There is no clear answer in the debate over whether domestic
courts should independently reference international law.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 1283, 1291, 1293.
306. Id. at 1295-96.
307. Id.
308. Alford, supra note 9, at 59-60.
309. Id. at 60.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 60, 64.
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Transnationalists believe domestic courts should continue to
reference international law, because the world is shifting from a
narrow, national view to an international perspective. Nationalists,
on the other hand, argue that regardless of the changing global
environment, the Constitution should remain constant to ensure
reliability and stability in the U.S. legal system. 3 Yet, it remains to
be seen whether the Supreme Court will continue to independently
reference international law to resolve constitutional questions. The
change in the face of the Court could signal a new era in the debate
over international law's place in U.S. jurisprudence.
313. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 630 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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